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The European Union is a community based on the rule of law. The EU legal order
is the backbone that holds the EU together, and the German Federal Constitutional
Court’s ruling in Weiss poses a profound threat to that legal order. This threat goes
far beyond the potential consequences of the Weiss ruling for European monetary
policy. We write this statement to express our shared view that the German Court’s
(Bundesverfassungsgericht – BVerfG) assertion that it can declare that a CJEU
judgment “has no binding force in Germany” is untenable and must be forcefully
rejected. We also write to challenge those versions of scholarship on constitutional
pluralism and constitutional identity that would defend the authority of the BVerfG
or any national court to make such a ruling and that helped (even if unintentionally)
encourage it to do so.
In recent decades, scholars developed the concept of constitutional pluralism as
a way to resolve the impasse between the Court of Justice of the European Union
(CJEU) and national constitutional courts, such as the BVerfG, over questions of
legal supremacy (Kompetenz-Kompetenz). The central question in that long standing
dispute concerns which court should have the final say in resolving conflicts between
EU law and national constitutional law.  Scholars of constitutional pluralism maintain
that there is no need for a definitive answer as to which court would have the final
say, as tensions over rival claims of superiority could be resolved through judicial
dialogue and norms of tolerance and accommodation.
The BVerfG ruling in Weiss – and the immediate reaction to that ruling by the
autocratic regimes in Hungary and Poland – demonstrates the inherent limits
of this optimistic vision. Let’s face it: constitutionalism pluralism can’t provide a
practical, ultimate answer to the question at the heart of the Kompetenz-Kompetenz
conundrum, as sometimes direct conflicts over who has the final say on disputes
over conflicts between EU and national law are unavoidable.
Those signing this statement agree with constitutional pluralists that judicial dialogue
is valuable – indeed it is integral to the functioning of the EU legal order. The Court
of Justice itself has recognised that national courts and tribunals, in collaboration
with the Court of Justice, fulfil a duty entrusted to them jointly of ensuring that in the
interpretation and application of the Treaties the law is observed. We also agree that
the CJEU and national constitutional courts should be guided by norms of mutual
tolerance, forbearance, and accommodation wherever possible, striving to reconcile
tensions between their legal orders on the basis of norms of comity.
In short, we are all sympathetic to constitutional pluralists’ desire to accommodate
the legitimate concerns that some national constitutional courts may have about
conflicts between EU law and inviolable aspects of their domestic constitutional
- 1 -
orders. In fact, such concerns are enshrined in the founding treaties of the EU (esp.
Articles 4 and 6, TEU). While there have been proposals to create new bodies
that might arbitrate constitutional conflicts between the CJEU and national courts
in the future, the law as it stands today is clear: no national court can overrule
a CJEU judgment. Though we do not agree on all aspects of the constitutional
pluralism debate, on one point we are unambiguously and emphatically united: it is
unacceptable for a national court to declare that a CJEU ruling is not binding in its
jurisdiction.  
As the Court of Justice has explained repeatedly since Costa, if national courts could
override the Court of Justice, EU law would not be applied equally or effectively
across all Member States and the entire legal basis of the EU would be called
into question. Indeed, as the CJEU emphasized in its recent press release, the
supremacy of EU law “is the only way of ensuring the equality of Member States in
the Union they created.” States have delegated part of their sovereignty to the EU
on conditions of reciprocity. If one of them could decide what EU law is for itself, it
would be more equal than the others, and the EU legal order would quickly unravel
as a result.
National constitutional courts, like the BVerfG, remain the sole guardians of their
countries’ constitutional orders, including the safeguarding of inviolable, “eternal”
elements of national constitutional identity. The BVerfG is perfectly correct about
this, but it is entirely wrong about the remedy it should apply if it deems that the
CJEU has made a ruling that violates its constitutional identity or is simply ultra vires.
By historical analogy, the BVerfG’s ruling is reminiscent of the nullification doctrine
invoked by the likes of Calhoun in the antebellum US, which would in essence allow
member state courts to “pick and choose” which EU laws to respect – and which
ones to disregard.
If a national constitutional court deems that an EU act or CJEU judgment clashes
with its constitution, it cannot simply deem the act or ruling inapplicable in its
jurisdiction. Rather, the court might seek to remedy the situation by “compelling their
government either to amend their constitution, to seek to change the EU legal norm
involved by working through the EU political process, or, if necessary, to withdraw
from the Union altogether.” Those might seem like dramatic steps, but they are
consistent with the EU’s status as a union of sovereign states, who have agreed –
voluntarily – to be bound by EU law and to respect rulings of its Court of Justice so
long as they remain members.   
Of course, most constitutional pluralists didn’t have in mind that national courts
would engage in  such brazen disregard for the authority of the CJEU. They
assumed that head-to-head conflicts could be avoided or worked out through
dialogue and accommodation. The crisis created by the BVerfG’s Weiss judgment
reminds us of a painful truth that many constitutional pluralists tried to wish away –
that sometimes direct conflicts will occur. 
Finally, the reactions of the autocratic regimes in Hungary and Poland to the
BVerfG’s judgment underscore another problem with constitutional pluralism – a
point several of us have been making for some time – namely that constitutional
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pluralism and constitutional identity arguments are prone to abuse by autocrats and
their captured courts. No one should be surprised by the fact that the governments
of Hungary and Poland quickly seized on the BVerfG’s ruling as a basis for arguing
that their (captured) constitutional courts could override the CJEU. This was entirely
predictable and indeed predicted.
Our focus in this statement is not on the risks the BVerfG’s ruling poses for the
ECB monetary policy. Rather, we want to emphasize that whatever one thinks of
the ECB’s quantitative easing programs, or of the CJEU’s or BVerfG’s assessment
of those programs, the notion that a national court can simply override a CJEU
judgment is inadmissible. Allowing national courts to declare that CJEU judgments
they deem unacceptable are inapplicable in their countries would destroy the
EU legal order. This is true whether the national court in question is a respected,
independent court in a healthy national democracy or the captured “court” of an
autocratic member state (which may not even meet the standards to qualify as
a court under EU law). Therefore the BVerfG’s assertion that the CJEU’s earlier
ruling in Weiss was ultra vires and has no binding effect in Germany must be firmly
rejected.
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